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A MYTH DECONSTRUCTED: THE "EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES"
ON THE LOW-PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
BY DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER'
ABSTRACT
In 2008, Vermont enacted the first "low-profit limited liability
company" statute, and since then seven other states have followed. L3C
proponents tout the device as: (i) a break-through in charitable giving,
enabling "socially beneficial enterprises" to leverage foundation money to
attract market-rate investors through "tranched investing; " (ii) a simple,
wise, and useful development in the law of limited liability companies; and
(iii) a method destined to be fast-tracked for special treatment under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code" or "IRC") dealing with
"Program-Related Investments" ("PRI") by charitable foundations.
Unfortunately, these glowing characterizations are each flatly wrong.
The L3C is an unnecessary and unwise contrivance, and its very existence
is inherently misleading. The notion that an L3C should have privileged
status under the Code is inescapably at odds with the key policies that
underpin the relevant Code sections. The L3C is not on track (let alone a
fast track) to any special status under the Code. Moreover, due to technical
flaws, the L3C legislation adopted to date is nonsensical and useless.
This article carefully debunks each major tenet of the L3C
"movement" and reveals the legal and practical realities under "The
Emperor's New Clothes." Using foundation funds to offer market-rate
returns to "tranched" investors is, at best, a complicated device; not
appropriate for "branding" and simplistic appeals to social conscience.
When afoundation contemplates making a program-related investment, the
matter requires careful, individualized, professional assessment, not
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reliance on a branded template. In this context, the L3C is but a snare and
a delusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Vermont enacted the first "low-profit limited liability
company" statute,' and seven other states followed.' Institutions as diverse
as the Federal Reserve,' the ABA's Real Property, Probate and Trust
Section,' and the Vermont Law School' have given credence to the "L3C"
model,' and at least twelve states have L3C legislation under consideration.'
Act effective Apr. 30 2008, 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 106 (LEXIS 2008) (codified at
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (Supp. 2009)).
2Limited Liability Company Act, 2009 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 96-126 (S.B. 239) (West,
Westlaw 2009) (codified as amended at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26 (Supp. 2010));
Limited Liability Company Act, 2010 La. Sess. Law Serv. No. 417 (H.B. 1421) (West, Westlaw
2010) (codified as amended LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1302 (West, Westlaw 2010)); Maine
Limited Liability Company Act, 2010 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 629 (West, Westlaw 2010) (codified as
amended ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1611 (West, Westlaw 2010) (effective July 1, 2011));
Michigan Limited Liability Act, 2008 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A. 566 (West, Westlaw 2008) (codified
as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4102 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009)); Limited Liability
Company Act, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 2010-187 (S.B. 208) (West, Westlaw 2010) (codified as
amended N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 57C-2-01 (West, Westlaw 2010)); Utah Revised Limited
Liability Company Act, 2009 Utah Laws Ch. 141 (West, Westlaw 2009) (codified as amended at
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412 (Supp. 2009)); Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, 2009
Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 55 (West, Westlaw 2009) (codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
102 (2009)).
Sue Woodrow & Steve Davis, The L3 C: A New Business Modelfor Socially Responsible
Investing, COMMUNITY DIVIDEND (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov.
2009, at 1, 4-5, available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/cd/09-4/CommDiv _2009_4.pdf
(discussing the relevance of the L3C model as a tool to increase access to PRIs). For a contrary view
in the same publication, see Daniel S. Kleinberger & J. William Callison, When the Law Is
Understood L3C No, COMMUNITY DIVIDEND (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis,
Minn.), Nov. 2009, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publicationspapers/pubdisplay.cfm?id-4490
(explaining that "our skepticism may make us seem like a pair of Grinches, [but] [wie have each
been involved in the law and practice of limited liability companies (LLCs) for more than 20 years,"
teaching and writing extensively about LLCs, and "after careful study of the relevant law, ... the
enthusiasm [for the L3C model] is misplaced [and] [t]he L3C concept is fundamentally flawed,
needlessly risky, and at best counterproductive").
4ABA Activities Calendar, http://www.abanet.org/rpte/meetings_cle/calendar.html (follow
"Calendar"; then select the date Mar. 2, 2010) (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) (advertising a March 2010
CLE presentation on PRI facilitation via L3C construct). The section subsequently offered "equal
time" to a panel of L3C critics. Another View of Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies: The
Issues and Concerns with Respect to L3Cs for Your Private Foundation Clients CD-ROM, April 13,
2010 (including experts J. William Callison, Robert R. Keatinge, and Daniel S. Kleinberger).
5Vermont Law Review 10th Annual Symposium, http://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/images/
symposium 1 0.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) (advertising a symposium focusing on the Vermont
L3C and other developments in social entrepreneurship).
6The abbreviation L3C sometimes confuses newcomers. The number "3" refers to the "L"
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L3C proponents tout the device as a breakthrough in charitable
giving-a simple, wise, and useful development in the law of limited
liability companies---destined to be fast-tracked for special treatment under
the provisions of the Code that deal with PRIs by charitable foundations.!
Unfortunately, these glowing characterizations are flatly wrong.?
The "L3C" is an unnecessary and unwise contrivance; its very
existence is inherently misleading. Due to technical flaws, the current L3C
legislation is nonsensical and useless. Moreover, the notion that an L3C
should have privileged status under the Code is inescapably at odds with the
key policies underpinning the relevant Code sections. The L3C is not on
track-let alone on a fast track-to any special status under the Code.
Debunking "The Emperor's New Clothes" should be done
painstakingly, thus this article proceeds through several parts. Part II
summarizes the L3C concept and its proponents' claims. Part m provides
background on the limited liability company and highlights the aspects of
LLC statutes relevant to a discussion of L3Cs. Part IV explains the concept
of PRIs. Part V critiques the L3C construct and exposes its fundamental
flaws under several different areas of law, including the law of limited
liability companies, securities regulations, and PRIs. Part VI concludes with
a call to repudiate the L3C construct."o
not the "C." See Woodrow & Davis, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that "L 3 C" stands for low-profit
limited liability company).
'H.B. 2102, 87th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); H.B. 2139,87th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2009); H.B. 10-1111, 67th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Session (Colo. 2010); S.B. 150, 2010
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010); H.B. 371, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010); S.B. 430, 427th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010); H.B. 5, 427th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010); H.B. 4589,
186th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009); H.B. 817, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009);
H.B. 1890,95th Gen. Assem., 2dReg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); H.B. 235, 2009 Leg., 61st Sess. (Mont.
2009); S.B. 6726, 2009 Leg., 233d Sess. (N.Y. 2010); Assem. B. 10414, 2009 Leg., 233d Sess.
(N.Y. 2010); H.B. 2886, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S.B. 472, 106th Gen. Assem., Ist
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2009); H.B. 664, 106th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2009); H.B. 261,
2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010); Assem. B. 902, 99th Leg., 2009-10 Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2010).
8See infra Part IV.
9For an incisive and pointed critique from an Associate General Counsel at John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, one of the country's leading charitable foundations, see David
S. Chernoff, L3Cs: Less There than Meets the Eye, 22 TAX'N EXEMPTS 3 (2010) (acknowledging
that Mr. Chernoff "has been involved with program-related investments for over 20 years [and his
opinions] do not necessarily reflect those of the MacArthur Foundation").
'oState charity regulators voice serious concerns about the L3C construct. For example, the
2009 NAAG/NASCO Annual Charitable Trusts and Solicitations Conference (October 18-21, 2009,
Austin, Texas) included a panel discussion on L3C issues. See Open Memorandum from Chris
Cash, President, Nat'l Ass'n of State Charity Officials, and Dennis P. Cuevas, Consumer Prot.
Project Dir. & Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Generals 1 (Aug. 17, 2009),
http://www.nasconet.org/2009%20Conference (follow "Conference Announcement-Public")
(advertising upcoming conference designed to address charitable regulation issues). The National
Association of State Charities Officials has expressed concern that "the state L3C legislation we are
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II. THE L3C CONSTRUCT
On its face, L3C legislation appears simple and innocuous. The
legislation amends a state's existing limited liability company statute to
create a subcategory of LLC subject to special restrictions as to purpose, and
special requirements as to name. An LLC becomes a "low-profit limited
liability company" by proclaiming the status in its articles of organization"
and including a special L3C designator in its name.12
By statute, an L3C's purposes are tightly restricted. The restrictions
are designed to implement the L3C's central purpose-"to dovetail with the
federal IRS regulations relevant to Program Related Investments (PRIs) by
foundations""-so as to allow foundations to invest some of their assets in
private, profit-making enterprises formed to advance socially desirable goals.
The dovetailing is evident from the language of the restrictions, which derive
from the Treasury Regulations delineating permissible PRIs" and cite
sections of the IRC. The Vermont statute, for example, establishes the
following requirements for a low-profit limited liability company:
(A) The company:
seeing encourages the diversion of charitable assets away from the nonprofit sector and toward a
new and untried corporate form that may lack the supervision state charity officials now exercise
over true public charities." Letter from Chris Cash, President, Nat'l Ass'n of State Charity Officials,
to Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, and Senator Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate
Fin. Comm. 2 (Mar. 19, 2009), http://data.opi.mt.gov/legbills/2009/Minutes/Senate/Exhibits/
jus65b04.pdf. The regulators' concerns, however, are beyond the expertise of the author and
detailed discussion of those concerns is beyond the scope of this article.
"805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(b) (West Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV.
§ 450.4102(2)(m) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-403(1)(c), -412(l)(a)(i)
(Supp. 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3023(a)(6) (Supp. 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-
102(a)(ix) (2009).
12805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-10(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS
SERV. § 450.4204(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-106(8) (Supp. 2009);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3005(a)(2) (Supp. 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-105(a) (2009). It
appears that L3C status is best created when the LLC is first formed. Nothing in the statutory text
so requires, but the concept itself is defined as "a person organized under [the LLC statute] that is
organized for a business purpose that satisfies and is at all times operated to satisfy each of the
[highly-restrictive] requirements" of L3C status. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (Supp. 2009)
(emphasis added); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-5 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Act
96-897); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4102(2)(m) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-15-102(a)(ix) (2009). Under this definition, if the LLC has never operated outside the L3C
strictures, it should be possible to form an LLC and later amend its articles to obtain L3C status.
13L3 C Advisors, What is the L3C?, http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/
Supportingdownloads/BasicL3CExplanation-History.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (explaining the
function of the L3C model).
141The regulations appear at Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3 (2009), and are discussed infra Part IV.
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(i) significantly furthers the accomplishment of one
or more charitable or educational purposes within the meaning
of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B);" and
(ii) would not have been formed but for the company's
relationship to the accomplishment of charitable or educational
purposes.
(B) No significant purpose of the company is the production
of income or the appreciation of property; provided, however,
that the fact that a person produces significant income or
capital appreciation shall not, in the absence of other factors, be
conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the
production of income or the appreciation of property.
(C) No purpose of the company is to accomplish one or more
political or legislative purposes within the meaning of Section
170(c)(2)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(c)(2)(D) [influencing legislation and elections].'"
Although by statute an L3C must have a charitable or educational
purpose," the L3C's raison d'dtre is to combine foundation money with
money from entrepreneurial investors."
The central premise of an L3CS operation is its use of low-cost
capital in high risk ventures and its ability to allocate risk and
'5The cited section of the IRC defines the term "charitable contribution" in relevant part as:
[A] contribution or gift to or for the use of... [a] foundation ... organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only
if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment),
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B), 2522(a)(2) (2006).
'6VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)-(C) (Supp. 2009); see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
180/1-26(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4102(2)(m) (2009); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412(l) (Supp. 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102(a)(ix) (2009).
1
7See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(ii) (2009). It is unclear whether the
referenced L3C statutes exclude from an L3C's permissible purposes the items listed in 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(c)(2)(B), other than educational and charitable purposes. For example, might an L3C be
properly formed to own and operate an animal shelter?
'8See Americans for Community Development, About L3 C,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/about.html (last visited June 1, 2010).
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reward unevenly over a number of investors, thus ensuring
some a very safe investment with market return. As is
appropriate under the PRI structure, foundations could assume
the top risk at very low return, making the rest of the
investment far more secure."
Thus, an L3C exists to (i) receive foundation money through the PRI
mechanism and then (ii) leverage that money with investments from for-
profit private investors. As a matter of regulatory law, L3C proponents
claim that L3C status will streamline the PRI process.20 As a matter of
finance, L3C proponents extol the benefits of "tranched investing" as a
means of social change." The L3C construct
facilitates tranched investing with the PRI usually taking first
risk position thereby taking much of the risk out of the venture
for other investors in lower tranches. The rest of the
investment levels or tranches become more attractive to
commercial investment by improving the credit rating and
19Id
20This claim is debunked infra Part V. The principal proponent of the L3C appears to be
Robert Lang and Americans for Community Development, an L3C created by Mr. Lang. See
Americans for Community Development, http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org (last
visited June 1, 2010). According to that website:
Americans for Community Development was formed to turn the L3C into a major
force in American philanthropy to better meet the mission of helping communities
and the people who live there throughout the world. The L3C is a new form of
limited liability company (LLC) that combines the best features of the LLC with
the social conscience of a non-profit. Robert Lang, CEO of The Mary Elizabeth &
Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation, Inc. who created the L3C, calls the L3C "the
for profit with a non profit soul."
Id.; see also Cassady V. Brewer & Michael J. Rhim, Using the 'L3C' for Program-Related
Investments, 21 TAX'N EXEMPTS 11, 13 (2009) ("[The L3C] was conceived by Robert Lang, CEO
of the Mary Elizabeth & Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation, with assistance from Marcus Owens of
Caplin & Drysdale.").
21State regulators, among others, are skeptical of this claim. For example, the 2009
NAAG/NASCO Annual Charitable Trusts and Solicitations Conference included panel discussions
on charitable regulations, consistent with L3C issues. 2009 NAAG/NASCO Conference Agenda,
http://www.nasconet.org/2009%20Conference (follow "Conference Agenda-Public Day") (last
visited June 11, 2010); see also Letter from Chris Cash, President, Nat'l Ass'n of State Charity
Officials, to Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, and Senator Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S.
Senate Fin. Comm. 2 (Mar. 19, 2009), http://data.opi.mt.gov/legbills/2009/Minutes/Senate/
Exhibits/jus65b04.pdf (regarding L3C legislation); David Edward Spenard, Panacea or Problem: A
State Regulator's Perspective on the L3C Model, 65 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. (Tax Analysts Special
Report) 36, 39 (2010) ("The claim that the L3C model will open floodgates that are holding back
access to billions if not trillions of dollars of investment, a major selling point for the model,
wanants skepticism.").
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thereby lowering the cost of capital. It is particularly favorable
to equity investment. Because the foundations take the highest
risk at little or no return, it essentially turns the venture capital
model on its head and gives many social enterprises a low
enough cost of capital that they are able to be self sustainable.22
Note that the foundation creates the financial base for the project. The
foundation's position involves a high-risk/low-gain investment rather than a
more traditional grant.23 Additional capital comes from sources seeking to
make at least some profit.24
Proponents of the L3C have high hopes for its utility and impact.25
According to these proponents, before the creation of the L3C, foundations
had to move cautiously when considering PRIs due to the high transactional
costs and bureaucratic hurdles. 26 Consequently, PRIs were not common and
certainly did not provide a major impetus to socially beneficial investing.27
With the L3C in place, L3C proponents predict substantial change:
The L3C ... makes it very easy for lawyers and laymen alike to
grasp since it does not create a new structure but merely
amends the definition section of the 1lc [sic] acts in most
states .... Probably more importantly than anything else, the
L3C is a brand which stands for all this and more and hopefully
as a brand will make the concepts easy to grasp and thereby
frequently used.28
III. THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY EXPLAINED
For most intents and purposes, the LLC did not exist as a viable entity
until 1988 when the IRS acknowledged that: (1) its "Kintner" tax
classification regulations meant what they said, and (2) Wyoming's then
novel creation-the Wyoming limited liability company-would be taxed as
22Americans for Community Development, About L3C,




26See Americans for Community Development, The History of the L 3C,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/about.html (last visited June 1, 2010).
27See id.28L3C Advisors, supra note 13.
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a partnership, even though none of the company's owners had anything like a
general partner's automatic liability for the company's debts."
Today, every state has an LLC statute, and new LLC formations far
outnumber new corporate formations almost everywhere in the country.30
Except in unusual circumstances, the LLC has become the "vehicle of
choice" for new business formation. Moreover, large, publicly-traded
corporations increasingly use single-member limited liability companies to
serve as wholly-owned subsidiaries.'
It is commonplace to characterize the LLC as a hybrid entity, an
overlap of partnership and corporate constructs. The Wyoming State
Supreme Court, for example, stated that "limited liability companies are a
conceptual hybrid, sharing some of the characteristics of partnerships and
some of corporations."32 The Federal District Court in Delaware
characterized LLCs as "hybrid entities that combine desirable characteristics
of corporations, limited partnerships, and general partnerships,"3 3 and the
California Court of Appeals noted that "[a]n LLC is a hybrid entity that
offers certain advantages over corporations and partnerships, by combining
aspects of each."34
"The essence of an LLC is the co-existence of partnership tax status
with corporate-like limited liability."" The great advantage of the LLC is its
ability to resolve the "tax shield conundrum":
Before the advent of the LLC, it was impossible to have
both the tax status of a partnership and the liability shield of a
corporation. In effect, entrepreneurs who wanted the complete,
corporate shield had to pay some form of tax cost for this
29See DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS § 13.1.4 (3d ed. 2008) (providing an overview of LLC developmental history). For
a more detailed account, see CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW T 1.01[1]-[3] (2006).
30Rex Blackburn & Dale G. Higer, The New LLC Act Preserves Idaho's Traditions, 52
ADvoc. 16, 16 (2009).
31See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29,1 4.02; see also Heather M. Field, Checking
in on "Check-the-Box," 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 485-87 (2009).
32Lieberman v. Wyoming.com L.L.C., 11 P.3d 353, 357 (Wyo. 2000). For a more nuanced
approach to this issue of characterization, see Daniel S. Kleinberger, The LLC as Recombinant
Entity: Revisiting Fundamental Questions Through the LLC Lens, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
473, 473 (2009) ("[A]n LLC combines attributes of four different types of business organizations:
general partnerships, limited partnerships, corporations, and closely held corporations.").
33Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 383 (D. Del. 2000).
34Nw. Energetic Servs., L.L.C. v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 649 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008).
35BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, 1 1.01[1].
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protection. In its simplest manifestation, that cost consisted of
double taxation of a business's profits. An ordinary C
corporation is a taxable entity; it pays dividends out of its after-
tax "earnings and profits." Those profits are then generally
taxed again in the hands of the shareholders when distributed to
them in the form of dividends.
Partners avoid this double-taxation because partnerships
are not taxable entities. Partnership profits (whether distributed
or not) are deemed to pass through to the partners, at which
level they are taxed but once. Partners can also benefit directly
from partnership losses, which also pass through and can serve
as deductions for the individual partners. In contrast, the losses
of an ordinary corporation stay with the entity, and are thus
useful only if the entity later enjoys a profit. Partnerships are
also advantageous in other realms, including the treatment of a
partner's basis in his interest.
The problem with partnerships has, of course, been
personal liability. Prior to the advent of limited liability
partnerships and limited liability limited partnerships
[developments that followed the advent of LLCs], at least one
partner of every partnership had to be liable for the business's
debts-thus the tax-shield conundrum."
In the early days of LLCs, tax classification constraints produced a
"family resemblance" among most LLCs," but in 1997 the IRS's "check-the-
box regulations" eliminated all connection between an LLC's structure and
the entity's eligibility for partnership tax status." There remain, however,
certain essential characteristics of the LLC:
BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, 11.01[2], at 1-9 to -10 (footnotes omitted).
"Work-arounds" existed before the advent of LLCs, most notably S Corporations and limited
partnerships, but each work-around carried its own problems. Id.
3 7 KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, § 13.1.4, at 462-63.
38For a detailed discussion of the "check-the-box" regulations, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER,
supra note 29, 1 2.01-2.08. The Sixth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the IRS's radical
change in Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372, 374, 380 (6th Cir. 2007). See Thomas E.
Rutledge & Scott E. Ludwig, The Sixth Circuit Affirms Littriello: "Check-the-Box"Regulations are
Upheld, 106 J. TAX'N 325, 327 (2007).
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A creature of state law, each LLC is organized under an LLC
statute that creates the company, gives it a legal existence
separate from its owners (called "members"), shields those
members from partner-like vicarious liability, governs the
company's operations, and controls how and when the company
comes to an end."
Under all LLC statutes, the rules governing relations among the
members and the LLC are almost entirely "default" rules-i.e., subject to
change by agreement among the members. Typically, the members'
agreement is called the "operating agreement," and the operating agreement
is the "cornerstone" or "chartering agreement" of each LLC.40 According to
the Official Comments to the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act, "an LLC's operating agreement serves as the foundational contract
among the entity's owners,"41 and "flexibility of management structure is a
hallmark of the limited liability company."42
IV. PROGRAM RELATED INVESTMENTS (PRIs) EXPLAINED
In order to understand the nature and importance of PRIs, it is first
necessary to understand the status of foundations under the Code and the
39Fashion Valley Mall, L.L.C. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 330 n.1 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009) (quoting BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, 1.01[1], 1-7 to -8 (2006)).
40These characterizations come from Delaware courts, referring to Delaware LLCs. See Elf
Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999) (cornerstone); Haley v. Talcott, 864
A.2d 86, 94 (Del. Ch. 2004) (chartering agreement). Another Delaware Court of Chancery opinion
is even more emphatic: "[L]imited liability companies are creatures of contract, 'designed to afford
the maximum amount of freedom of contract, private ordering and flexibility to the parties involved.'
To the extent defendants intend to argue otherwise, plaintiff need not offer a rebuttal." Travel Ctrs.
of Am., L.L.C. v. Brog, 2008 WL 1746987, at * 1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2008) (quoting In re Grupo Dos
Chiles, L.L.C., 2006 WL 668443, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 2006)). The situation, however, is
essentially the same under all other LLC statutes. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§ 110(a) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 442 (2008). This statute provides that, subject to a limited list
of specific exceptions,
the operating agreement governs: (1) relations among the members as members and
between the members and the limited liability company; (2) the rights and duties
under this [act] of a person in the capacity of manager; (3) the activities of the
company and the conduct of those activities; and (4) the means and conditions for
amending the operating agreement.
Id.
4'REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT, Prefatory Note, Noteworthy Provisions ofthe New
Act: Operating Agreement (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 410 (2008).
42REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 301(a) cmt. a (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 469
(2008).
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protective limitations the Code and Treasury Regulations impose on
foundations.43 In particular, it is necessary to understand the prohibitions on
speculative investments and the requirement that foundations annually
distribute a specified portion of their assets.
Private foundations enjoy tax-exempt status" and exist within a
myriad of tax regulations designed to protect charitable assets from
imprudent management and diversion to the benefit of non-charitable
purposes or private persons.45 These regulations have strong teeth;
contravention brings excise taxes so heavy that one expert has described
them as "toxic."46 Speculative investments and investments for improper
43For a detailed analysis of this topic, see Carter G. Bishop, The Low Profit LLC (L3C):
Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243 (2010). For a
discussion of exempt organization commercial activity and joint ventures, see BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, T 1.09.
"This status allows donors to deduct contributions. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2006) (permitting a
deduction for any charitable contribution made within the taxable year); I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D)
(2006) (defining "charitable contribution" to include those made to or for the use of section
501(c)(3) organizations). Moreover, "[t]raditionally, real estate owned by charities is exempt from
real estate property taxes." BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, 1 1.09, at 1-424.
45
1I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). The statute provides tax exempt status for specified
organizations
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual.
Id; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.50 1(c)(3)-1(c)(2) ("An organization is not operated exclusively for one
or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private
shareholders or individuals."). The regulations are also intended to protect the commercial realm
from unfair competition from enterprises that benefit from tax-exempt status. E.g. Clarence LaBelle
Post No. 217, Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. United States, 580 F.2d 270, 277 (8th Cir. 1978)
("The legislative history of the unrelated business income tax provisions clearly establishes that the
provisions were enacted with the primary objective of eliminating unfair competition between
exempt and non-exempt organizations."); Fla. Hosp. Trust Fund v. C.I.R., 103 T.C. 140, 159 (1994).
In Florida Hosp. Trust Fund, the Tax Court applied I.R.C. § 501(m) (Certain Organizations
Providing Commercial-Type Insurance Not Exempt From Tax) and quoted the House Committee
Report as follows:
The committee is concerned that exempt charitable and social welfare
organizations that engage in insurance activities are engaged in an activity whose
nature and scope is so inherently commercial that tax-exempt status is
inappropriate. The committee believes that the tax-exempt status of organizations
engaged in insurance activities provides an unfair competitive advantage to these
organizations.
Id.
46Bishop, supra note 43, at 244-46, 252-53.
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purposes are "jeopardizing investments."47 Jeopardizing investments trigger
substantial excise taxes, not only for the foundation,48 but also "on the
participation of any foundation manager in the making of the investment,
knowing that it is jeopardizing the carrying out of any of the foundation's
exempt purpose. . . ." Moreover, "private inurement" (i.e., benefits to
ineligible purposes or persons) can destroy a foundation's tax-exempt
status.so This prohibition has "zero tolerance," at least in theory." In
addition, foundations face nearly confiscatory taxes to the extent they fail to
properly distribute at least 5% of their assets annually."
These regulatory provisions, strict both in substance and in penalty,
create the context in which PRIs make sense. The function and virtue of a
Program Related Investment are (1) to permit private foundations to make
investments, rather than grants, in mission-appropriate enterprises; (2)
without the investments being considered speculative or otherwise
"jeopardizing"; (3) with the investments counting toward the minimum
annual payout required of foundations.
The enabling regulations, however, are strict:
A program-related investment is an investment which
possesses the following characteristics:
(i) The primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish
one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B)
[charitable purposes];
(ii) No significant purpose of the investment is the production
of income or the appreciation of property; and
47Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (2009).
48Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a) (2009).
49 d. at § 53.4944-(b).
5oUnited Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1174 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994)).
51See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, 1.09[1][c][i][A]; see also Wendy L.
Parker Rehab. Found., Inc. v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 51, 52 n.2 (1986) ("The prohibition
against private inurement, in contrast, is complete, and the amount and extent of such inurement is
not determinative." (citing Church of the Transfiguring Spirit, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 1, 5 (1981))).
Private foundations must also comply with an independent, non-tax, but conceptually parallel
regime of state law regulation. See Spenard, supra note 21, at 36.
52I.R.C. § 4942(d)-(e) (2006).
53Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4944-2 (regarding private foundation investments), 53.4944-3
(regarding jeopardizing investments), 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2) (recognizing PRIs as qualifying
distributions to satisfy the 5% requirement) (2009).
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(iii) No purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or
more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(D)
[influence legislation/elections].5 4
Although at first glance all three requirements seem generic, the first
requirement is actually foundation-mission specific:
An investment shall be considered as made primarily to
accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section
170(c)(2)(B) if it signficantly furthers the accomplishment of
the private foundation's exempt activities and if the investment
would not have been made but for such relationship between
the investment and the accomplishment of the foundation's
exempt activities."
Consequently, each time a foundation considers making a PRI, the
foundation must make a situation-specific determination that carefully takes
into account the foundation's mission, the purpose of the organization
receiving the investment, the relationship of the receiving organization's
purpose to the foundation's mission, and how the governance and financial
structure of the receiving organization ensures that the receiving organization
will operate within the PRI requirements. At a minimum, the last-mentioned
issue requires the foundation to carefully monitor the activities of the
receiving organization."6 Prudence likely requires a substantial amount of
control." Either way, devising a PRI arrangement requires careful and
individualized investigation, deliberation, negotiation, and drafting. An
54Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1) (2009).
"Id. at § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) (emphasis added).
56See Bishop, supra note 43, at 262 ("[A] foundation investment in an LLC may qualify as a
PRI and escape the § 4944 tax, but it requires active monitoring over the LLC's use of the PRI funds
to assure the § 4945 tax is not asserted."); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(3)(i):
[A]n investment which ceases to be program-related because of a critical change in
circumstances shall in no event subject the foundation making the investment to
the tax imposed by section 4944(a)(1) before the 30th day after the date on which
such foundation (or any of its managers) has actual knowledge of such critical
change in circumstances.
Id.
57Bishop, supra note 43, at 263 ("[P]resumably the controls granted by the foundation over
the LLC guaranteed that the foundation would exercise proper expenditure oversight authority to
negate the § 4945 taxable expenditure tax.").
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opinion of counsel is almost de rigueur, and prudence sometimes warrants
seeking a private letter ruling from the IRS."
The IRS issued only one public ruling on PRIs. The ruling involved
"a fairly innocuous private foundation that provided low interest rate loans to
blind persons to allow them to establish their own businesses."" To date, the
IRS has issued only one private letter ruling concerning a PRI to a limited
liability company."o The ruling described a receiving organization subject to
substantial ongoing control by the investing foundation."1
The private letter ruling did not pertain to an L3C and did not involve
the use of program related investments as a lure for investors seeking a full
market rate of return. Indeed, the type of tranched investments advocated by
L3C proponents is novel for PRIs,62 and, as explained below, the tranch
approach raises conflict of interest issues between foundation and market-
oriented investors." This tension increases the need for careful, situation-
5 1d. at 258-59; see also Spenard, supra note 21, at 39.
Perhaps the reason many private foundations approach some PRI
transactions with caution is that they realize arrangements between charitable
entities and for-profit entities can be very complex, and intentionally investing their
assets in transactions expected to produce below-market returns is inherently risky.
The reason many private foundations seek private letter rulings may be because
they understand that PRI transactions that push the envelope in terms of producing
income or the appreciation of property should be approached with caution.
Id. Compare the attitude of insouciance expressed on the website of the L3C's principal proponent:
"We honestly believe if an L3C is used and the IRS regulations are followed there will not be an
issue. No one asks permission to drive the posted speed limit why ask the IRS if you can follow
their regulations?" Robert Lang, PRIs and Private Letter Rulings,
http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/supportingdownloads/PrivateLetterRulings.pdf (last
visited May 29, 2010).
59Bishop, supra note 43, at 261 (citing Rev. Rul. 78-90, 1978-1 C.B. 380).
6I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 10, 2006).
61Id.
62 1The IRS issued other private letter rulings concerning PRIs into other forms of business
organization, but none of those rulings pertained to tranched investments. Nonetheless, despite the
absence of any IRS rulings on either L3Cs or the tranched investment approach, an L3C proponent
has chastised an IRS official for "[his] assertion that the Service has not yet considered the federal
tax implications of foundation investments in L3Cs" and has stated that the assertion "is not entirely
accurate and, in fact, may be misleading." Letter from Marcus S. Owens, Attorney, Caplin &
Drysdale, to Ronald Schultz, Senior Tech. Advisor, Tax Exempt & Gov't Entities Div., Internal
Revenue Serv. (July 8, 2009), available at http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org
/downloads/im4511_20090708_164517.pdf.
6 3The approach also concerns regulators:
It is important to point out that "low-profit" in the context of an L3C does not
necessarily describe a situation in which each participant investing in the venture is
agreeing to a low-profit or below-market return. Rather, the L3C provides a
structure through which there is an uneven allocation of risks and expected returns.
Spenard, supra note 21, at 37; see also Chemoff, supra note 9, at 5 ("This author [proponents of
L3Cs] is just cynical enough to suggest that some people supporting L3Cs are doing so because
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specific planning by foundations considering making a program related
investment into a tranched low-profit limited liability company.
In addition, the tranch approach creates special risks of private
inurement, which likewise require careful forethought, planning, and
monitoring. Depending on how much an L3C is tilted toward the market-
rate investors, the investing foundation risks being seen as benefitting-even
as a side effect-substantial numbers of individuals distinct from the
foundation's purpose. In that situation, the foundation's benevolent purpose
will not save it from a private inurement problem."
In sum, when a foundation considers making a PRI, prudence requires
a careful, individualized, and professional approach, even-perhaps
especially-when the proposed receiving organization is an L3C."
V. THE L3C CONCEPT DEBUNKED
L3C proponents see the low-profit limited liability company almost as
a conceptual messiah, come to lead charitable giving and socially conscious
investors to a new Jerusalem." The homepage for Americans for
L3Cs would provide opportunities for entrepreneurs and for-profit developers to tap into a new
market for low-cost funding for projects that do well for them and also happen to do some public
good.")
"See Canada v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 973 (1984). As explained by the court:
Respondent [IRS] contends that the KLCC [Kneadmore Life Community Church]
was operated to a substantial degree for nonexempt purposes in that it benefited
private interests. Specifically, respondent points out that community members
could live on, raise animals and grow crops for personal consumption and for sale
on, and conduct businesses on, community land without paying rent to the KLCC
and that the KLCC carried on communal activities such as community gardens and
orchards and communal use of KLCC farm equipment and seeds. Moreover,
students (or ex-students) from Indiana University were often drawn to the
community for the purpose of exploring alternative lifestyles.
Id. at 981. The Tax Court ruled against KLCC, despite "accept[ing] the sincerity of the beliefs of
the members of the KLCC, the religious character of their beliefs, and the assertion that the KLCC
was their chosen instrument alike for furthering their beliefs." Id. at 982. If a tranched L3C tilts too
heavily toward the market-oriented investors, the private benefit analysis may be analogous. For a
further discussion of this issue, see Bishop, supra note 43, at 263.
6See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-l(a)(2)(i), (b) (2009) (articulating standards of knowledge,
care, and appropriate reliance on legal opinions).
"See e.g., Brewer & Rhim, supra note 20, at 18.
The arrival of the L3C potentially is a watershed moment for individuals and
organizations that are dedicated to achieving social change. By combining the
unique features of an LLC with the "soul" of a nonprofit, the L3C may result in
dramatic increases in the availability of both private and philanthropic capital for
ventures that are designed to further charitable and educational purposes.
Id; see also Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice ofEntity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL.
L. REv. 337, 371 (2009) ("Not long ago a man named Robert Lang appeared on the social enterprise
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Community Development features a changing banner that lists "just a few of
the ways the L3C can help."" Those ways include:
to save existing farms . .. help an otherwise struggling
company in today's competitive environment or . .. buy an
empty factory, re-equip it to be a source for many
jobs ... make a museum or other non-profit self
sufficient ... address food and housing issues . .. provide
sustainable solutions to medical, sanitation, conservation,
energy, and environmental issues."
Elsewhere the L3C has been touted as "A New Solution to New
Problems,""9 with the power, for example, to revitalize industries that are
"suffering from increased global competition." 0 Possible applications
include "nonprofit structure for museums, concert halls, symphonies,
recreational facilities and the hundreds of thousands of nonprofits that
perform service for the government under contract, with the government as
their primary source of revenue.""
The key to the L3C is its supposed superior connection to PRIs.72
"What we're doing is opening up PRIs and the whole socially beneficial
scene promoting the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, or 'L3C,' as a new type of LLC
specifically designed to accommodate the needs of hybrid social ventures."). For a thought on why
proponents have been able to succeed with state legislators, see Chemoff, supra note 9, at 5
(referring to "well-intentioned but misinformed state legislators voting in favor of L3Cs, most of
whom would respond with a quizzical look at anyone who mentioned Reg. 53.4944-3(a) [the PRI
regulations]").
Americans for Community Development, http://www.americansforcommunity
development.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
68ld
69Nonprofit Law Blog, L3C-Developments & Resources, http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com
/home/2009/03/13c-developments-resources.html (Mar. 15, 2009) (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
7"Id
7
'Americans for Community Development, About LC, http://www.americansforcommunity
development.org.about.html (last visited June 15, 2010); see also Social Enterprise Blog, The L3C a
Complete Backgrounder, http://socialenterpriseblog.com/?p=10 (Oct. 28, 2009, 11:08 EST) (last
visited June 15, 2010) (providing a more complete description about L3Cs than Wikipedia and
citing Robert M. Lang's recommendation to visit Americans for Community Development's website
for frequent developments).
72The states that enacted L3C legislation apparently accept this connection without
hesitation. Legislative history on each enactment is scant, but the available information
demonstrates that legislative sponsors relied uncritically on information provided by L3C proponents
and portrayed L3Cs as having great upside potential and no downsides. For example, many of the
relevant legislators' remarks focused on the L3C's supposed PRI fast track.
Some of these legislators simply repeated the sentiments of Americans for Community
Development. See, e.g., Illinois Senator Heather Steans, Steans Advances New Socially Responsible
For-Profit Organizations (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.se-alliance.org/ChicagoL pksteans.pdf ("Time
[Vol. 35894
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sector .... [The L3C] will become a vehicle for bringing in more money to
socially beneficial entities without compromising the return."" The L3C is
"a new tool for social enterprise,""4 with the potential to "unleash more
funding for for-profit companies with social missions.""
The potential is apparently enormous because the L3C will allow the
"tranching" of investments. At the lowest level or "tranch," a foundation
will make a low-return, high-risk investment in a "venture[] with modest
financial prospects, but the possibility of major social impact."" At the next
level, the venture will draw investments from socially conscious investors
willing to take a below-market return for the sake of participating in a
progressive form of free enterprise that will help make a better world. At the
top level, the venture will be able to attract regular, profit-maximizing
and again I have seen companies pass up opportunities to invest in LLCs ... due to an inability to
establish a concrete tax exemption for the plausible investment endeavor."); Michigan Senator Jason
Allen, Senate Passes Allen Legislation to Help Charitable Foundations (Nov. 6, 2008),
http://www. senate. michigan.gov/gop/readarticleprintable.asp ?id=1828&District-37 ("Current IRS
regulations make it difficult for private nonprofit entities, like charitable foundations, to participate
in such ventures when they are structured as LLCs . . .. Our reform plan simplifies the
system .... ); Vermont State Representative Michel Consejo, Summary of Bills Passed by the
Assembly that Michel and the Commerce Committee Worked On: (H775) An Act Relating to Low-
Profit Limited Liability Companies, http://michelconsejo.web.officelive.com/ beendone.aspx (last
visited Feb. 18, 2010) ("[P]rivate letter rulings are expensive and time-consuming, and as a result,
few foundations make them. The purpose of the L3C is to bypass this process .... .").
One legislator went so far as to directly support Robert Lang's proposition that the IRS will
necessarily adopt the L3C model, stating that "there are enough states now that are pursuing this that
it looks like the IRS will be able to adopt and sanction this without the need for the private letter
rulings that they've had to give in these instances." Audio: Kraig Powell, Utah House of
Representatives, Remarks During Floor Debate Regarding S. Bill 148 (Mar. 10, 2009), available at
http://le.utah.gov/jsp/jdisplay/billaudio.jsp?sess=2009GS&bill=sbO 148&Headers-true (follow
"House Day 43" hyperlink and direct quote is approximately at 2:15).
Critical analysis of L3C legislation is almost wholly absent in the legislative records. The
only suggestion for improvement of the L3C came from the Michigan Department of Labor &
Economic Growth's analysis of that State's L3C bill: "[M]ore detail would be desirable. There is an
entire statute devoted to nonprofit corporations.. . . At the very least, there should be a separate
chapter of the act devoted to L3Cs." Michigan Department of Labor & Economic Growth, Analysis
of Enrolled Senate Bills 1445-6, http://michigan.gov/documents/dleg/Analysis-of
EnrolledL3CBills_261198_7.pdf (Dec. 17, 2008) (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) (declaring its overall
support for the bill).
7 3Heather Peeler, The L3C: A New Tool for Social Enterprise, 2 COMMUNITY WEALTH
VANGUARD, Aug. 2007, http://www.communitywealth.com/Newsletter/August/*202007/L3C.html.
74Community Wealth Vanguard (2007), http://www.communitywealth.com/Newsletter/
August/o202007/August%202007%20CW%20Vanguard.htmi.
75Id.
76Marc J. Lane, L3Cs Hold Key to Solving State's Social Woes, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS.,
Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.marcjlane.com/index.php?src-news&refho-288&category-2008%
20Lane%20Reports (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). This investment will come from funds that a
foundation might otherwise distribute as a grant to a non-profit venture.
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investors whose participation at market rates is made possible by the
subsidization of the lower two tranches.
"Because the foundations take the highest risk at little or no return, it
essentially turns the venture capital model on its head and gives many social
enterprises a low enough cost of capital that they are able to be self
sustainable."" Thus, the L3C has the potential to "leverage foundations'
program-related investments to access trillions of dollars of market-driven
capital . . . .""
Unfortunately, this conceptual messiah is a pretender; this emperor
lacks clothes. L3Cs have no special ability to promote PRIs, and the L3C
construct is unnecessary, unwise, and inherently misleading. Current L3C
legislation is so technically flawed that it undermines the very arrangements
it seeks to promote. Moreover, the L3C "movement" owed much of its
initial momentum to its claim that the IRC would be changed to give special
preference to foundation investments in L3Cs." That claim has now
evaporated.
A. The L3C is Unnecessary
According to its proponents:
The central premise of an L3C's operation is its use of low-cost
capital in high risk ventures and its ability to allocate risk and
reward unevenly over a number of investors, thus ensuring
some a very safe investment with market return. As is
appropriate under the PRI structure, foundations could assume
the top risk at very low return, making the rest of the
investment far more secure.80
In fact, this type of complex arrangement is possible under every
state's regular LLC statute. L3C proponents acknowledge that flexibility of
nL3C Advisors, supra note 13.
78Lane, supra note 76.
9In some contexts, L3C proponents have acknowledged as much. Response from Robert
M. Lang, CEO, The Mary Elizabeth and Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation, to NASCO, Answering
Question 6 from Questions Posed in NASCO's Letter Dated March 19, 2009 (Apr. 17, 2009)
http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/NASCO.pdf ("The L3C concept, if
existing solely in state law, will do little to reduce the current transactional costs associated with a
foundation making a PRI investment.").
sAmericans for Community Development, About L3C,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/about.html (last visited June 1, 2010).
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structure is the hallmark of the limited liability company: "The L3C was built
on the llc [sic] structure in order to provide the flexibility of membership and
organization needed to cover a wide variety of social enterprise situations."8
L3C legislation adds nothing by permitting a limited liability company
to have a "low profit" purpose. Many LLC statutes no longer require a for-
profit purpose.82 For those that do, "low profit" certainly qualifies. No LLC
statute requires a limited liability company to seek the highest possible profit
margin. Moreover, by hypothesis, many L3Cs will, in fact, seek high-yield
returns for at least some of their members.
An ordinary LLC can certainly be structured to receive and make use
of foundation PRIs. Indeed, the private letter ruling often mentioned in
connection with L3Cs involved an ordinary limited liability company.83
In sum, from the perspective of state entity law, there is nothing an
L3C can do that cannot already be done through an ordinary LLC.84
B. The L3C "Brand" is Unwise
The proponents of the L3C claim that:
The L3C . .. makes it very easy for lawyers and laymen alike to
grasp since it does not create a new structure but merely
amends the definition section of the 1lc [sic] acts in most
states .... Probably more importantly than anything else, the
8'L3C Advisors, supra note 13.
82See e.g., REVISED UNiF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 104(b) (amended 2006), 6B U.L.A. 437
(2008) ("A limited liability company may have any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for
profit."); see also id § 104(b) cmt. ("Although some LLC statutes continue to require a business
purpose, this Act follows the current trend and takes a more expansive approach."). In addition,
some states have expressly provided for LLCs with non-profit purposes. See e.g., KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 275.015(18), 275.520-275.540 (West Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.975 (West
2004 & Supp. 2008). For a discussion of the Kentucky provisions, see Thomas E. Rutledge, The
2007 Amendments to the Kentucky Business Entity Statutes, 97 KY. L. J. 229, 249-50 (2008).
83I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 10, 2006), discussed supra at pp. 14-15 and infra
nn. 103-105 and accompanying text.
8One commentator, with more than 20 years of PRI practice experience, characterized as
"nonsense" the notion that "[a] private foundation could not make a PRI in an LLC before L3Cs
were authorized." Chemoff, supra note 9, at 4. Mr. Chemoff explains:
For years, tax practitioners-both in-house and outside legal counsel-have
structured and closed PRIs in the form of purchases of membership interests in
regular LLCs with multiple members. They have often done this by including
charitable purposes language and prohibitions against use of funds for political
purposes or lobbying in the LLC's operating agreement and purchase agreement for
the membership interests.
Id. at 4-5.
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L3C is a brand which stands for all this and more and hopefully
as a brand will make the concepts easy to grasp and thereby
frequently used."
As explained above," the L3C's principal selling point is its supposed
ability to attract PRIs, and the L3C is described as specifically designed "to
dovetail with the federal IRS regulations relevant to Program Related
Investments (PRIs) by foundations." " But PRI ventures are anything but
"easy to grasp." The regulations are complex, and L3C legislation does
nothing to remove that complexity." In addition, investments by charitable
foundations into profit-making ventures raise a host of complicated non-tax
issues, including, for example, potential conflicts of fiduciary duty for the
foundation trustees, securities law concerns, and "exit rights" for the
foundation. In these circumstances, a "brand" is simplistic and dangerous."
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the great complexity. First,
consider the amount of control that each foundation must retain over any
L3C enterprise into which the foundation invests. As explained in Part IV,
making sure that a foundation's investment qualifies as a PRI requires a very
fact-intensive analysis of the purposes of the foundation, the purposes of the
investment vehicle, and the foundation's ability to control the investment
vehicle."
85L3C Advisors, supra note 13.
8See supra Part II.
8Americans for Community Development, About L3C,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.orgabout.html (last visited June 1, 2010). But see,
e.g., JOINT STUDY COMMITTEE ON A NORTH CAROLINA APPLIED FURNITURE TECHNOLOGY
CENTER, REPORT To THE 2007 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1-2 (2007),
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/documentsites/legislativepublications/Study/ 20Reports%20to%20the%
202007%20NCGA/NC%2OApplied%20Fumiture%20Technology%2OCenter.pdf("The Com-mittee
heard a presentation on low-profit limited liability companies (L3Cs) ... [which] have been
proposed as a means for encouraging investment in struggling business enterprises [but] [t]he
Committee was concerned about ensuring that investment in a L3C by a non-profit would qualify as
a program-related investment so that the non-profit would not run afoul of IRS regulations.").
88See supra Part IV (explaining the nature of the determination and showing how
designating an entity as "low-profit" does not reduce the complexity or fact-specific nature of each
determination); supra Part I, at 2-3 (explaining how L3C proponents initially claimed that the IRC
would be amended to "green light" foundation investments into L3Cs).
"The issues discussed in the following text apply equally to an ordinary limited liability
company used as a vehicle to receive PRIs. The point is not that such issues are "deal breakers" or
otherwise pose insurmountable difficulties. Rather, the point is that the idea ofan L3C "brand"-
i.e., a simple, off the shelf mechanism-is unwise and inherently misleading.
90See supra Part IV. As will be demonstrated infra Part V(C), the L3C will do nothing to
facilitate the PRI determination or to simplify the process of PRI analysis.
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The foundation must at least assure itself that it can prevent the L3C
from deviating from the "program related" purposes that brought the
foundation into the enterprise in the first place. Such protection is certainly
possible, but there are numerous ways to structure the protection. Each
possible variation has implications for the foundation and for each of the
other investors in the L3C. Finding the proper "deal point" takes
sophisticated analysis-business as much as legal-and requires careful,
tailored drafting of the L3C's operating agreement. Inevitably, thoughtful
negotiation is also required. There is nothing "off the shelf" about this type
of endeavor, and the supposed L3C "template" does nothing to facilitate the
analysis, the negotiation, or the drafting."
Next, consider the possible conflicts of interests for those managing a
foundation that has made an important PRI into an operating business. The
managers of the foundation have a duty to the foundation to maintain some
oversight of the business.92 The L3C's operating agreement will therefore
have to provide for that oversight, and it is likely that a representative of the
foundation will have some governance role in the business."
Suppose, however, that at some point the interests of the foundation
and those of the "top tranch" investors substantially diverge. Assume, for
example, that: (i) a foundation makes a PRI into a business that operates a
factory in an economically depressed area; (ii) the business develops
intellectual property that is so valuable that a foreign corporation wishes to
91See Posting of Robert Lang to triplepundit, http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/04/13c-will-
the-irs-favor-social-progress ("The L3C templates a deal, brands it and makes it easier to construct.")
(last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
92Even proponents of the L3C accept this point. See e.g., Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice
ofEntity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 370 (2009).
Where a social enterprise is dedicated to social outcomes but requires participation
by for-profit capital investment, the two can easily be brought together under the
roof of a single LLC because the membership agreement can reward the for-profit
investors with a large share of any profits, while the social benefit nonprofit actors
can retain ultimate decision-making power and thereby ensure that the firm
remains committed to its social and/or environmental purpose.
Id.
9 3The foundation might obtain sufficient control by imposing lender-like positive and
negative covenants, including veto power over specified categories of decisions. See e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (Supp. 2010) ("A limited liability company agreement may provide
rights to any person, including a person who is not a party to the limited liability company
agreement, to the extent set forth therein."); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT, § 112(a) (amended
2006), 6B U.L.A. 449 (2008) ("An operating agreement may specify that its amendment requires the
approval of a person that is not a party to the operating agreement or the satisfaction of a condition.
An amendment is ineffective if its adoption does not include the required approval or satisfy the
specified condition."). Of course, this approach would require very careful analysis, negotiation,
and drafting.
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acquire the business in order to acquire the intellectual property; (iii) the
foreign corporation is willing to continue operating the factory for three
more years, but no longer; (iv) the takeover will be highly profitable for the
top tranch investors, and they naturally want the deal to go through; and (v)
the middle tranch investors may be conflicted, since by hypothesis they have
invested in part to make money and in part to "do good." Assume further
that the takeover cannot occur without the consent of the foundation's
representative. Presumably, the foundation does not want the factory to
close and would prefer to use the value of the intellectual property to
continue to subsidize the important social enterprise (i.e., the factory and the
jobs it provides).
If the L3C's operating agreement fails to address this situation very
carefully, the foundation's representative may be hopelessly conflicted-
caught among duties to the entity, loyalty to the foundation's goals, and
duties to the top tranch investors. Those who manage a limited liability
company have fiduciary duties not only to the entity,94 but also, in some
circumstances, directly to the members." Moreover, because the
foundation's representative will be serving, in essence, as a deputy of the
foundation, any breach of duty by the representative will likely inculpate the
foundation." In Illinois, in particular, representatives of all cooperating
organizations may be conflicted."
9See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, 10.01 (providing an overview on
management duty).
"See Daniel S. Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of Limited Liability
Companies, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 90 (2006) ("Claims that management has sold out too cheaply
in a merger are ... examples of direct claims."). It is possible to reshape the fiduciary duties owed
by an LLC's manager, and under Delaware law it is even possible to eliminate fiduciary duty. See
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6 § 18-1101(c) (Supp. 2010).
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other person has
duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited liability company or to another
member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by
a limited liability company agreement, the member's or manager's or other person's
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited
liability company agreement ....
Id. The reshaping or elimination, however, must be done very carefully, lest unintended
consequences result. See generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, 1 14.05[4][a] (2006 &
Supp. No. 2 2009) (analyzing scenarios when a manager's egregious conduct was held to have been
in bad faith and noting the 2004 amendments to Delaware law permitting LLCs to "eliminate"
fiduciary duties); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Careful What You Wish For-Freedom ofContract and the
Necessity of Careful Scrivening, 24 PUBOGRAM 19 (2006) (describing the freedom of contract and
the role it has played in litigation involving LLCs).
"See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 7.04 ("A principal is subject to liability to a
third party harmed by an agent's conduct when the agent's conduct is within the scope of the agent's
actual authority or ratified by the principal; and the agent's conduct is tortuous .... ); see also
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971). As the court explained:
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Sinclair nominates all members of Sinven's board of directors. The Chancellor
found as a fact that the directors were not independent of Sinclair. Almost without
exception, they were officers, directors, or employees of corporations in the
Sinclair complex. By reason of Sinclair's domination, it is clear that Sinclair owed
Sinven a fiduciary duty.
Id. Moreover, the foundation will likely have to defend and indemnify its representative. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317A.521 subdiv. (1)(c)(3), subdiv. (2) (West 2004). This statute provides for
a non-profit corporation to defend and indemnify a person acting in the person's "official capacity"
and defines that term to mean:
[W]ith respect to a director, officer, or employee of the corporation who, while a
director, officer, or employee of the corporation, is or was serving at the request of
the corporation or whose duties in that position involve or involved service as a
director, officer, partner, trustee, employee, or agent of another organization or
employee benefit plan, the position of that person as a director, officer, partner,
trustee, employee, or agent, as the case may be, of the other organization or
employee benefit plan.
Id. at § 317A.521 subdiv. 1(c)(3); see also MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 8.51(a), 8.52, 8.56
(3d ed. 2008) (describing when nonprofits may indemnify individuals, directors and officers).
Comparable problems can arise if the foundation has used a lender-like approach. The combination
of control and the foundation's equity position invite a re-characterization of the control as a
governance role carrying fiduciary duties. See In re Kids Creek Partners, L.P., 200 B.R. 996, 1016
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Courts reason that a lender usurping the power of the debtor's directors and
officers to make business decisions must also undertake the fiduciary obligation that the officers and
directors owe the corporation and its creditors."); see also In re Villa W. Assocs., 146 F.3d 798,
806-07 (10th Cir. 1998). While the court rejected a claim that limited partners owned fiduciary
duties in the case sub judice, it noted that, under Kansas law, whether there exists a
fiduciary relationship between parties does not depend upon some technical
relation created by, or defined in, law .. . . [but rather whether] there has been a
special confidence reposed in one who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to
act in good faith and with due regard for the interests of the one reposing the
confidence.
Id. (quoting Gillespie v. Seymour, 796 P.2d 1060, 1063 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990), rev'din part on other
grounds, 823 P.2d 782 (1991)). The court further noted:
Fiduciary relationships recognized and enforceable in equity do not depend upon
nomenclature; nor are they necessarily the product of any particular legal
relationship. [Citations omitted.] They may arise out of conduct of the parties
evidencing an agreement to engage in a joint enterprise for the mutual benefit of
the parties. [Citations omitted.] But they necessarily spring from an attitude of
trust and confidence and are based upon some form of agreement, either expressed
or implied, from which it can be said the minds have met in a manner to create
mutual obligations. [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 807; In re Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 153 B.R. 457, 479 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993) ("[W]here
excessive lender control or influence can be established, the lender may be placed in a fiduciary
capacity.").
97Illinois's L3C statute defines "any chief operating officer, director, or manager of [an L3C
as] a 'trustee' as defined in Section 3 of the [Illinois] Charitable Trust Act." 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 180/1-26(d) (West Supp. 2010). In Illinois, a charitable trustee has the duties to "avoid. . .
conflicts of interest" and "[t]o adhere and conform the charitable organization to its charitable
purpose." 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/15(a)(1), (4) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Act 96-897).
According to the statutes, then, in an Illinois L3C all managers, whether representing a foundation
or a for-profit organization, must uphold the charitable purpose of the venture.
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Further complexity exists due to federal and state law regulating
securities. Generally, the "investment contract" analysis applies to determine
whether a membership interest in an LLC is a security." The determination
is highly significant and carries high risk; both federal and state statutes
impose significant registration and disclosure requirements on ventures that
"issue" securities (even those whose securities are not publicly traded). The
"investment contract" analysis is complex, but essentially turns on whether a
person is investing in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits to
be made chiefly through the efforts of others. That question depends largely
on the extent investors have a right (and, in some circumstances, the
practical ability) to manage the enterprise. Day-to-day control is not
necessary to avoid securities status, but certainly manager-managed LLCs
are more likely to involve securities than are member-managed LLCs."9
For an L3C, the securities law determination will be especially
complicated because nominally, at least, the foundations will not be
investing with any expectation of profit'o and yet will need some
fundamental control over the enterprise. Depending on how fundamental
that control is, its existence could increase the likelihood that the other
investors are purchasing a security from the L3C when they become
members (co-owners) of the L3C. In any event, the securities determination
will differ for each tranch of investors.
Consider also the question of "exit rights"-the right of an investor to
have its interests bought out by either the other owners or the venture itself.
The question of exit rights is fundamental in any investment made in a
business whose interests are not publicly traded, and the question has
manifold complexity.'o' The other side of the issue is whether the venture
can require that a particular owner exit the venture.' 2
"For a detailed explanation of this area of law, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29,
ch. 11. Some states apply an additional test for making the security vel non determination. See id.
1.03A (Supp. 2009) (describing the "risk capital" test).
99BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 29, 11.03.
'"As explained supra Part IV, for an investment to qualify as a PRI, "[n]o significant
purpose of the investment [can be] the production of income or the appreciation of property." Treas.
Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(ii) (2009).
'01See generally F. HODGE ONEAL ET AL., O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:5 (Rev. 3d ed. 2009) (describing various
protection measures available to minority shareholders in a closely held corporation); see also
Homing v. Homing Constr., LLC, 816 N.Y.S. 2d 877, 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). The court
expressed that
[o]ne certainly can sympathize with petitioner's plight. In 2001, he had a thriving
corporation and wished to reduce his work schedule. Whether for estate and gift
tax reasons, or otherwise, he brought in two trusted men and gave them each one
third ownership of a new venture set up as a LLC. But he did this without prior or
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As with the securities analysis, foundation involvement infuses
additional complications. Take as an example the enterprise that was the
subject of Private Letter Ruling 200610020,'03 sought by a foundation
proposing to make a PRI in an Investment Fund.'" The ruling outlines both
the purposes of the foundation and the purposes and overall structure of the
enterprise that would receive the PRI:
The Foundation's charitable programs focus on helping
individuals attain economic independence by advancing
educational achievement and entrepreneurial success, with the
ultimate goal of promoting a society of economically
independent individuals and engaged citizens who contribute to
the improvement of their communities. The Foundation
develops and implements programming focused on promoting
education and entrepreneurship and is particularly committed
to programs that advance both goals, as is the case with the
current proposal.
The Foundation proposes to acquire a membership
interest in the A (the "Fund"), which will be organized for the
purpose of investing in businesses in low-income communities
owned or controlled by members of a minority or other
disadvantaged group that have not been able to obtain
conventional financing on reasonable terms, and that will
provide community benefits. In addition to the Foundation,
the other Members of the Fund will be current or former
professional athletes on, or owners, coaches or managers ofa
professional sports team located in the greater B metropolitan
contemporaneous execution of an operating agreement giving him fair exit rights in
the event of future disharmony.
Id.; Frontier Oil v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027, at *31 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005), reprinted in 30
DEL. J. CORP. L. 993, 1048 (2005) (stating, in the context of a failed merger agreement, "Frontier's
angst stems from the nature of an agreement that allowed multiple exit strategies"); Daniel S.
Kleinberger, The Closely HeldBusiness Through the Entity-Aggregate Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 827, 863-68 (2005) (discussing how exit rights are viewed differently depending on the type
of legal entity involved).
102Depending on the structure of the venture, various terms describe the mechanisms
employed to address this issue-e.g., call rights, expulsion, mandatory puts, etc.
1o3I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 10, 2006).
14See Americans for Community Development, The L3C: A For-Profit with a Non-Profit
Soul,http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/low-profit limited liability
companies 13c 10.06.09.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) (citing this Private Letter Ruling as an
example of how PRIs can fuel socially beneficial investment).
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area, or athletes, owners, coaches or managers from other
professional sports teams who currently reside in the greater B
metropolitan area. Members may invest in their individual
capacities, through a permitted assignee, or through an entity
they control .... The proposal requires that the Members who
are individuals (or, in the case of a Member that is an entity
[controlled by an individual],. . . an individual who controls
the entity participate in an educational program regarding angel
investing and entrepreneurship that will be developed and
provided by the Foundation to the Individual Members."o'
Now consider the "exit" issues that might arise if one of the individual
members were a high profile athlete whose conduct gave rise to unpleasant
notoriety-e.g., dog fighting, or shooting oneself in the leg while at an
expensive nightclub.o6 If the enterprise's operating agreement is properly
tailored, the enterprise will have the right to expel the miscreant from the
venture, thereby limiting any negative publicity and attendant problems
(including problems for the foundation's reputation). In turn, and again
assuming that the enterprise's operating agreement is properly tailored, the
foundation will have sufficient power to cause the enterprise to exercise its
right to expel.'
It is no easy task to anticipate such problems at the outset of a venture,
however, nor to foresee the multitude of other situations in which
dissociation would be appropriate or even necessary to protect the
foundation's interests. Even when problems are appropriately anticipated,
devising solutions acceptable to all parties is difficult. The task requires the
ability to balance often countervailing interests and to design workable
mechanisms to effect that balance. The task is one of the most sophisticated
in all of transactional lawyering and is far from "easy to grasp."'
'oI.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 10, 2006) (emphasis added).
0
6oSee John Eligon, Burress Will Receive 2-Year Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/2 1/nyregion/21burress.html; Lynn Zinser, Vick
Pleads Guilty to Dogfighting Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/20
08/11/26/sports/football/26vick.html. See generally JEFF BENEDICT, OUT OF BOUNDS: INSIDE THE
NBA'S CULTURE OF RAPE, VIOLENCE, AND CRIME (2004) (noting the large numbers of National
Basketball Association players who have been charged with felonies).
07As alternative or additional protection, the foundation might insist that it have the right to
withdraw upon the happening of specified events. Again, conceptualizing, delineating, and
obtaining agreement to this approach would require careful thought, negotiation, and drafting.
1
0
8See Spenard, supra note 21, at 39.
Perhaps the reason many private foundations approach some PRI transactions with
caution is that they realize arrangements between charitable entities and for-profit
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C. The L3C Construct is Inherently Misleading
As previously explained, the assertion that a PRI can be simple is
flatly wrong and substantially misleading. Moreover, considerable
misinformation exists regarding the relationship between the L3C device and
the tax law relating to PRIs.
Until very recently, state L3C legislation was premised on the notion
that the IRC would be amended to treat foundation investments into low
profit limited liability companies as automatic PRIs.'" The website for
Americans for Community Development still states that:
[W]e have introduced The Program-Related Promotion Act of
2009, a version of which was discussed with Senate Finance
Committee staff on Dec. 18, 2008 and with the Joint
Committee on Taxation staff on Jan. 15, 2009. The objective
of the proposed legislation is to facilitate PRIs by private
foundations, in part by amending section 4944(c) of the Code
to provide a process by which an entity seeking to receive PRIs
can receive a determination that below-market foundation
investments in such entity will qualify as PRIs."o
An initial version of the proposed legislation provided for "Safe
Harbor Determinations" and a rebuttable presumption to "green light"
foundation investments made into L3Cs:
entities can be very complex, and intentionally investing their assets in transactions
expected to produce below-market returns is inherently risky. The reason many
private foundations seek private letter rulings may be because they understand that
PRI transactions that push the envelope in terms of producing income or the
appreciation of property should be approached with caution.
Id.
09See Letter from Chris Cash, President, Nat'l Ass'n of State Charity Officials, to Senator
Max Baucus, Chairman, and Senator Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Fin. Comm. 2
(Mar. 19, 2009), http://data.opi.mt.gov/legbills/2009/Minutes/Senate/Exhibits/j us65b04.pdf.
[P]roponents of the low-profit limited liability company (commonly referred to as
an "L3C") reportedly have made the case in state legislatures that these changes on
the federal level are imminent and therefore the states need to get on board and
create this L3C entity. Proponents have distributed a draft bill titled, "Program
Related Investment Promotion Act of2008," and have said that the Senate Finance
Committee approves of the concept and is working on the legislation. We're
concerned that these assertions may lack a basis in fact, yet have proven quite
effective in persuading state legislators to pass these bills into law without giving
them the close scrutiny they deserve.
Id.
1"oL3C Advisors, supra note 13.
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The Secretary shall establish a procedure under which an entity
seeking to receive program-related investments may petition
the Secretary for a determination that below market rate
investments by private foundations in such entity will be
program-related investments meeting the requirements [for
Program Related Investments] .... Under this procedure, the
Secretary shall rule on all requests within 90 days of
submission. Entities organized under state law, or the law of
any federally-recognized tribe, as low-profit limited liability
companies shall be entitled to a rebuttable presumption that
below market rate investments by private foundations in such
entities are program-related investments.'"
The proponents' reference to meeting with key congressional staff
suggested that the Program-Related Promotion Act of 2009 was under
serious consideration. The facts, however, were quite the contrary. On
March 11, 2009, Paul Streckfus, editor of the influential E.O. Tax Journal,
sent "Email Update 2009-34," captioned "Chuck Grassley: More Legislation,
More Oversight Needed for Charities." The update quoted Senator Chuck
Grassley, R-lowa, Ranking Member of the Senate Finance Committee, at a
session on charities and governance sponsored by Buchanan Ingersoll &
Rooney, Washington, D.C.:
There is ... a proposal to loosen private rules and regulations
to allow them to more easily fund certain for-profit entities.
There is very little information about these new entities, known
as low-profit, limited liability companies, or L3Cs. Neither the
Finance Committee nor the Ways and Means Committee has
conducted any hearings about them. So I was a little surprised
that the loosening of the tax rules for them was proposed as a
stimulus initiative. It's too early for us to consider this
proposal."2
"'MARY ELIZABETH & GORDON B. MANNWEILER FOUNDATION, INC., PRI PROMOTION
ACT OF 2008 (Draft of Dec. 15, 2008), § 2, available at http://www.cof.org/files/Documents
/Conferences/LegislativeandRegulatory06.pdf (emphasis added) (copy on file with author).
"l2Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator of Iowa, Grassley Outlines Goals
for Charitable Governance, Transparency (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://grassley.senate.gov
/news/Article.cfm?customel dataPagelD 1502=19725; see also G. Ann Baker, Did You Know?:
Low-Profit Limited Liability Company Legislation, 29 MICH. BUS. L.J. 5, 6 (2009) (quoting the
Senate Finance Committee: "We are committed to strengthening charities and philanthropy.
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The "safe harbor" approach has no future. It would impose a
substantial burden on the Treasury, and the concept of a deadline is novel,
unjustified, and unworkable."' More fundamentally, the rebuttable
presumption ignores the core of PRI analysis-i.e., the suitability of the
investment vehicle, judged in terms of the particular purpose of the investing
foundation, and the particular purpose and structure of the investment
vehicle." 4
Consider, for example, a foundation with a charter that limits the
foundation to promoting education among underprivileged children.
Suppose further that this foundation were to make an investment in an L3C
formed to own and operate a furniture factory. In what sense would the
foundation's investment pertain to "the accomplishment of the foundation's
exempt activities?""' Many other examples are available, because any
However, we have not had any hearings on this particular matter and do not think that it is ripe for
federal legislation").
"3Moreover, the safe harbor would impose substantial additional burdens on state charities
regulators.
If we simplify the process through which we combine the charitable assets of
private foundations with for-profit investment, we increase the risk that charitable
assets will be utilized for subsidizing for-profit ventures. The framework that
stands to move nonprofits and private foundations toward greater
commercialization in their activities increases the risks that charitable assets will be
looked to for the production of income or the appreciation of property rather than
serving an exempt purpose. In the context of the L3C model, the benefit of
eliminating the costs associated with private letter rulings for some PRI
transactions may be outweighed by the increase in risk that charitable assets could
be converted or diverted to a private use or otherwise wasted or mismanaged.
Spenard, supra note 21, at 40.
14As Spenard, an individual experienced with state charities regulation, stated:
[T]o the extent that the intent of the L3C model appears to simplify those
transactions and make them more common by eliminating requests for private letter
rulings, it causes concern among some state regulators because it begs the question
of whether we are encouraging private foundations to leap before they
look .... The nature of PRIs is complex, and if we eliminate a step in due
diligence in order to eliminate a cost, we may get what we pay for, namely less due
diligence.
Id. at 39-41; see also Baker, supra note 112, at 6 ("When a low-profit limited liability company is
being formed consideration must be given to the Internal Revenue Service requirements regarding
program-related investments, and the issues raised by the National Association of State Charity
Officials may need to be addressed.").
" 5Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) (2009).
An investment shall be considered as made primarily to accomplish one or more of
the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) if it significantly furthers the
accomplishment of the private foundation's exempt activities and if the investment
would not have been made but for such relationship between the investment and
the accomplishment of the foundation's exempt activities.
Id.
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legislation that generally privileges L3C status would have to ignore the core
tenet of PRI law."'
L3C proponents now assert that L3C "legislation was specifically
written to dovetail with the federal IRS regulations relevant to Program
Related Investments (PRIs) by foundations." "7 In fact, the enacted L3C
legislation does nothing to help foundations seeking to assure themselves of
PRI treatment."'
D. Current L3C Legislation is Nonsensical and Useless
The tax regulations concerning PRIs require that "[n]o significant
purpose of the [foundation's] investment is the production of income or the
appreciation of property."" But the presupposition is that the private sector
will also invest, seeking a profit. Indeed, the proponents of the L3C device
highlight this presupposition: "[t]he central premise of an L3C's operation is
its use of low-cost capital in high risk ventures and its ability to allocate risk
and reward unevenly over a number of investors, thus ensuring some a very
safe investment with market return." 120
Despite this presupposition, the L3C statutes enacted to date do not
authorize profit-seeking investment by anyone.21 The typical L3C statute
provides that: "no significant purpose of the company is the production of
116There is some indication that L3C proponents understand this reality. See Posting of
Robert Lang to triplepundit, http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/04/13c-will-the-irs-favor-social-
progress (last visited June 2, 2010). Lang expresses that
[t]he IRS is never going to give a blanket ruling that L3Cs are OK because the law
does not give them that latitude. Each deal must obey the laws for PRIs and stand
on its own.. . .The L3C templates a deal, brands it and makes it easier to
construct but it is not a warranty. Just because you buy a car that can safely go 150
miles per hour does not grant you the right to drive 150. I know because I created
the L3C.
Id.
1 17Americans for Community Development, About L3C,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/about.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010)
(emphasis added).
"8Nor could it. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) (2009) ("Nor shall any State law
exempt or relieve any person from any obligation, duty, responsibility, or other standard of conduct
provided in section 4944 [taxes on investments which jeopardize charitable purpose] and the
regulations thereunder.").
"9Id. at § 53.4944-3(a)(ii) (emphasis added).
120Americans for Community Development, About L'C,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/about.html (last visited June 2, 2010).
121Even if they did, certain other provisions might prevent potentially lucrative profit-
making opportunities. See Kelley, supra note 92, at 372.
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income or the appreciation of property."'22 How is it possible to have a low
profit limited liability company when no signficant purpose ofthe company
is the production ofincome or the appreciation ofproperty? Try explaining
that contradiction to investors, especially investors who are simultaneously
being told that "tranched investing with the PRI . .. is particularly favorable
to equity investment."' Try doing a private placement memorandum (under
securities law) to explain the conundrum.124
The technical drafting error is easy to identify. The creators of the
L3C concept paraphrased the federal tax regulations that define PRIs. The
paraphrasing, however, produced a nonfunctioning result. A PRI
contemplates a mixed purpose venture, with the foundation's investment
being essentially not-for-profit but other investors actually seeking a
profitable return. Therefore, except where an L3C is acting as an entirely
non-profit entity, the success of the L3C presupposes that the company will
seek to make a profit.
It would be sophistry to assert that profit making is categorically
insignificant for low profit limited liability companies, especially as to L3Cs
using tranched investment. A central premise for L3C proponents is that-
by using PRIs and tranched investment-the L3C "will become a vehicle for
bringing in more money to socially beneficial entities without compromising
the return."'25
It might be possible to fix the statutory drafting problem, but doing so
would just further expose the unnecessary nature of the L3C construct. As
demonstrated above, a blanket "brand" does nothing to simplify, speed, or
otherwise facilitate the PRI analysis and a L3C "template" does nothing to
simplify, speed, or otherwise facilitate the complex arrangements required
before an entity can make constructive use of PRIs.
122805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(b)(1) (West Supp. 2010) (emphasis added); see
also MICH. CoMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.4102(2)(m)(ii) (Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-
412(l)(b)(iii) (Supp. 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B) (Supp. 2009); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-15-102(a)(ix)(B) (2009).
1
23Americans for Community Development, About L3C,
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/about.html (last visited June 2, 2010).
124L3C proponents seem to have missed this conceptual glitch. See e.g., Response from
Robert M. Lang, CEO, The Mary Elizabeth and Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation, to NASCO,
Answering Question 5 from Questions Posed in NASCO's Letter Dated March 19, 2009
(Apr. 17, 2009) http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/NASCO.pdf ("The L3C
concept provides that the primary purpose of the organization must be charitable, with the
production of income permitted to be a secondary purpose.").
125Peeler, supra note 73.
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VI. CONCLUSION
L3C legislation is no "friendly amendment" to a state LLC statute.
Using foundation funds to offer market-rate returns to "tranched" investors is
at best a complicated device, not appropriate for "branding" and simplistic
appeals to social conscience. When a foundation contemplates making a
PRI, the matter requires careful, individualized, professional assessment, not
reliance on a branded template.
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